New information regarding the Iranian airplane that was forced to land last month in Turkey should confirm suspicion of international covert operations inside the regime.
Last month, according to reports, an Iranian Revolutionary Guards-owned cargo plane was escorted to Diyarbakir airport and forced to land by a small formation of Turkish fighter jets. The plane, said to have been headed to Syria, was carrying 600 kilos of explosives, as well as rocket launchers, mortars, Kalashnikovs, and approximately $560 million. The government of Turkey claims several sources tipped them off, including one American military source, who requested that the pilot of the cargo plane be forced to land on Turkish soil.
Turkish authorities are said to have requested a list of the contents of the plane from the Iranian regime, in response to its demand for the return of its plane along with the contents. So far, the Iranian regime has not responded, likely fearing that providing such a list would be admitting that they actually dared to fly over Turkish airspace in order to deliver arms and money to Lebanon, Syria, and Hezbollah.
The question remains: How did the U.S. and international intelligence sources have access to such information? Have the most classified intelligence and security sectors of the Revolutionary Guards been penetrated? Dozens more examples have now come to light, making it clear that not only have the Revolutionary Guards been breached, but also the heart of the supreme leadership. For example:
The escapes of various nuclear experts and military commanders, such as former Revolutionary Guards’ Brigadier General Ali-Reza Asgari, who was also a former deputy defense minister.
The mysterious explosion in the suburbs of Tehran in the summer of 2008 which destroyed a Revolutionary Guards convoy carrying military equipment destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon, killing at least 15 people and injuring scores more.
A similar explosion in 2010 at Iran’s Shahab-3 ballistic missiles depot inside a Revolutionary Guards’ base located in the western Iranian province of Lurestan. More than 18 were killed and many injured along with the destruction of many missiles.
The Stuxnet virus, which infected the Iranian nuclear facilities, was most likely carried out by an asset on the ground.
Reports pointed to an informant inside the Guards after an illegal Iranian arms shipment of rockets and grenades destined for Gambia was discovered in Nigeria last October, and Quds Force commander Azim Aghajani, who was posing as a businessman, was subsequently arrested.
In just the last couple months, valuable information about Iran has helped with the confiscation of several ships and planes which were carrying arms and explosives either to Iran or from Iran to the Middle East and Africa. One such incident occurred last month: Malaysian police seized suspicious equipment found in two containers from a ship that left a Chinese port bound for Iran. The equipment was said to be for nuclear weapons.
It is important to note that China has been collaborating with the radicals ruling Iran ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and today continues to help Iran with its nuclear ambitions. (I submitted several reports on precisely that to the CIA during the time I worked as a spy inside the Revolutionary Guards, and have covered the Chinese connection in my book, A Time to Betray.) China was continuously providing arms to the Revolutionary Guards despite the U.S. arms embargo back then — even training Guards’ members at a base in China. The Chinese also provided Silkworm missiles to Iran, which threatened the security of the Persian Gulf. China has done all of this while publicly denying the collaboration in its entirety.
The recent events have forced Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security to conduct well-publicized sweeps of their hierarchy every once in a while in order to filter out the “spies” among them.
So far, not a single sector of the regime — including the parliament, the president’s office, and the supreme leader, who is the commander of the armed forces and who oversees all aspects of the regime — has questioned any of the incidents: not the forced landing of the plane in Turkey, the explosions in Iran, the impounding of all the cargo ships in international waters, the carrying of arms, or many other such episodes.
Though many brave men and women in and outside of Iran risk their lives each day to help confront this evil regime, the Iranian leaders — with their collaborations with China and North Korea — grow ever closer to obtaining the nuclear bomb. It is our responsibility to humanity and to future generations to help Iranians overthrow their messianic regime before it is too late for all of us.
Reza Kahlili is a pseudonym for an ex-CIA spy who requires anonymity for safety reasons. A Time to Betray, his book about his double life as a CIA agent in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, was published by Simon & Schuster on April 6.
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